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Abstract. In this paper the results of several agent-based simulations,
aiming to test the role of normative beliefs in the emergence and inno-
vation of social norms, are presented and discussed. Rather than mere
behavioral regularities, norms are here seen as behaviors spreading to
the extent that and because the corresponding commands and beliefs
do spread as well. On the grounds of such a view, the present work
will endeavour to show that a sudden external constraint (e.g. a barrier
preventing agents from moving among social settings) facilitates norm
innovation: under such a condition, agents provided with a module for
telling what a norm is can generate new (social) norms by forming new
normative beliefs, irrespective of the most frequent actions.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, the scientific domain of normative agent systems presents two main
directions of research. The first is focused on intelligent agent architectures, and
in particular on normative agents and their capacity to decide on the grounds of
norms and the associated incentive or sanction. The second is focused on much
simpler agents and the emergence of regularities from agent societies.
Very often, social scientific study of norms goes back to the philosophical
tradition that defines norms as regularities emerging from reciprocal expecta-
tions [22, 5, 15]. Indeed, interesting sociological works [23] point to norms as
public goods, the provision of which is promoted by 2nd-order cooperation [18,
19]. This view has inspired the more recent work of evolutionary game-theorists
[17], who explored the effect of punishers or strong reciprocators on the group’s
fitness, but did not account for the individual decision to follow a norm.
No apparent contamination and integration between these different direc-
tions of investigation has been achieved so far. In particular, it is unclear how
something more than regularities can emerge in a population of intelligent au-
tonomous agents and whether agents’ mental capacities play any relevant role
in the emergence or innovation of norms.
In this paper, we will concentrate on one of these capacities, norm recogni-
tion. We will simulate agents endowed with the capacity to tell what a norm is,
while observing their social environment.
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One might question why start with norm recognition. After all, isn’t it more
important to understand why agents observe norms? Probably, it is. However,
whereas this question has benn answered to some extent [10, 9] the question how
agents tell norms has received poor attention so far. Furthermore, the account
for the reason why agents observe the norms sheds poor light on our problem:
norms need to have emerged, before they are complied with for any reason.
In this paper, we will address the antecedent phenomenon, norm innovation,
postponing the consequent, norm compliance, to future studies. In particular,
we will endeavour to show the impact of norm recognition on norm innovation.
More precisely, we will observe agents endowed with the capacity to recognize a
norm (or a behavior based on a norm); generate by herself new normative beliefs
and transmit them to other agents by communicative acts or direct behaviors.
We intend to show whether a society of such normative agents allows norms
to emerge or innovate. (By norm innovation, we mean the process by means of
which the (set of) norm(s) shared within a (sub-)population changes in all or in
part at any given time). Hence, we intend to investigate not only how norms come
into existence, but also how they are maintained or replaced by other norms. The
notion of norms that we refer to [11] is rather general. Unlike a moral notion,
which is based based on the sense of right or wrong, norms are here meant in the
broadest sense, as behaviors spreading to the extent that and because (a) they
are prescribed by one agent to another, (b) and the corresponding normative
beliefs spread among these agents.
Again, one might ask why not to address our moral sense, our sense of the
right or wrong. The reason is at least twofold. First, our norms are more general,
including moral and social norms. Secondly, and moreover, agents can deal with
norms even when they have no moral sense: they can even obede norms they
believe to be injust. But in any case, they must know what a norm is.
2 Existent Approaches
Usually, in the formal social scientific field, that is in utility and (evolutionary)
game theory [5, 15, 25, 26, 28], the spread of new norms and other cooperative
behaviors is not explained in terms of internal representations. The object of in-
quiry is usually the conditions for agents to converge on given behaviors, which
proved efficient in solving problems of coordination [22] or cooperation [4], inde-
pendent of the agents normative beliefs and goals [6]. In this field, no theory of
norms based on mental representations (of norms) has yet been provided.
Game theorists essentially aimed to investigate the dynamics involved in the
problem of norm convergence. They consider norms as conditioned preferences,
i.e. options for action preferred as long as they are believed to be preferred by
others as well [5]. Here, the main role is played by sanctions: what distinguishes a
norm from other cultural products like values or habits is the fact that adherence
to a social norm is enforced by sanctions [16, 3] and the utility function, which
an agent seeks to maximize, usually includes the cost of sanction as a crucial
component.
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In the field of multi-agent systems [14, 21, 27], instead, norms are explicitly
represented. However, they are implemented as built-in mental objects. This
alternative approach has been focused on the question as to how autonomous
intelligent agents decide on the grounds of their explicitly represented norms.
Even when norm emergence is addressed [24], the starting point is some preex-
isting norms, and emergence lies in integrating them. When agents (with different
norms) coming from different societies interact with each other, their individual
societal norms might change, merging in a way that might prove beneficial to
the societies involved (and the norm convergence results in the improvement of
the average performance of the societies under study). Lately, decision making
in normative systems and the relation between desires and obligations has been
studied within the BDI framework, developing an interesting variant of it, i.e.
the so-called Belief-Obligations-Intentions-Desires or BOID architecture [7].
In none of these approaches, including the last one, it is possible for an
agent to tell that a given input is a (new) norm. On the contrary, obligations
are hardwired into the agents’ minds when the system is off-line. Unlike the
game-theoretic model, multi-agent systems certainly exhibit all of the advantages
deriving from an explicit representation of norms. Nevertheless, they overshadow
one of the advantages of autonomous agents, i.e. their capacity to filter external
requests. Such a filtering capacity affects not only normative decisions, but also
the acquisition of new norms. Indeed, agents take decisions even when they
decide to form normative beliefs, and then new (normative) goals, and not only
when they decide whether to execute the norm or not [12].
Despite the undeniable significance of the results achieved, these studies leave
some fundamental questions still unanswered, such as how and where norms
originate, how agents acquire norms, and more specifically, how agents tell that
something is a norm. Our feeling is that the question how norms are created
and innovated has not received so far the answer it deserves the role of norm-
recognition has been insufficiently perceived.
3 Objectives
Some preliminary simulations, discussed in [1], compared the behavior of a pop-
ulation of normative agents provided with a norm recognition module and a
population of social conformers whose behavior is determined only by a rule of
imitation. The results of these simulations show that under specific conditions,
i.e. moving from one social setting to another, imitators are not able to converge
on one behavior, even if this is common to different settings, whereas normative
agents are.
In this paper we want to find out the sufficient (even if not necessary) con-
ditions for existing norms to change. In particular, we want to show if a simple
cultural or material constraint can facilitate norm innovation. To see this, we
imagined a simple case in which subpopulations are isolated in different contexts
for a fixed period of time. The methaphor here is any physical catastrophe or
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political upheaval that divides one population into two separate communities.
The recent European history has shown several examples of this phenomenon.
4 Norm Innovation
Norms are highly adaptable artifacts, emerging, evolving, and decaying. If it is
relatively clear how legal norms are put into existence, it is much less obvious
how the same process applies to social norms. How do new social norms and
conventions come into existence? Some simulation studies about the selection of
conventions have been carried out, for example Epstein and colleagues’ study
of the emergence of social norms [15], and Sen and Airiau’s study of the emer-
gence of a precedence rule in the traffic [25]. However, such studies investigate
which one is chosen out of a set of alternative equilibriums. A rather different
sort of question concerns the innovation of social norms when no alternative
equilibriums are available for selection.
We propose that a possible answer might be discovered while examining
the interplay of communicated and observed behaviors, and the way they are
represented into the minds of the observers. If any new behavior α is interpreted
as obeying a norm, a new normative belief will be generated and a process of
normative influence will be activated [13]. Such a behavior will be more likely
to be replicated than would be the case if no normative belief were formed [2].
As shown elsewhere [9, 2], when a normative believer replicates α, she will be
likely to influence others to do the same not only by ostensibly exhibiting the
behavior in question, but also by explicitly conveying a norm. People impose new
norms on one another by means of deontics and explicit normative valuations and
propose new norms (implicitly) by means of (normative) behaviors. Of course,
having formed a normative belief is necessary but not sufficient for normative
influence: we will not answer the question why agents do so (a problem that we
solve for the moment in prbabilistic terms), but we address the question how
they can influence others to obey norms. They can do so if they have formed the
corresponding normative belief, if they know how one ought to behave.
5 Normative Architecture
We consider a norm as a social behavior that spreads trough a population thanks
to the diffusion of a particular belief, i.e. the normative belief. A normative
belief, in turn, is a belief that a given behavior, in a given context, for a given
set of agents, is either forbidden, obligatory, permitted, etc. Thus, for a norm-
based behavior to take place, a normative belief has to be generated into the
minds of the norm addressees and the corresponding normative goal has to be
formed and pursued. Our claim is that a norm emerges as a norm only when
it is incorporated into the minds of the agents involved [10, 11]; in other words,
when agents recognize it as such. In this sense, norm emergence and stabilization
implies its immergence [8] into the agents’ minds.
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5.1 Norm Recognizer
Our normative architecture (EMIL-A) (see [2] for a detailed description) consists
of mechanisms and mental representations allowing norms to affect the behaviors
of autonomous intelligent agents. EMIL-A is meant to show that norms not only
regulate the behavior but also act on different aspects of the mind: recognition,
adoption, planning, and decision-making. Unlike BOID in which obligations are
already implemented into the agents’ minds, EMIL-A is provided with a compo-
nent by means of which agents infer that a certain norm is in force even when it
is not already stored in their normative memory. In this situation the norm has
not already been incorporated into schemata, scripts, or other pragmatic struc-
tures [5]; hence, agents are not facilitated by any of these. Actually, the norm
needs to be found out, and only thereafter, stored. To implement such a capacity
is conditioned to modeling agents’ ability to recognize an observed or commu-
nicated social input as normative, and consequently to form a new normative
belief. In this paper, we will only describe the first component of EMIL-A, i.e.
the norm recognition module. This is most frequently involved in answering the
open question we have raised, i.e. how a new norm is found out and we claim that
to answer this question is particularly crucial in norm emergence, innovation and
stabilization.
Our Norm Recognizer (see Fig. 1) consists of three layers and a link to the
normative board, which is part of the agents long term memory. The normative
board contains normative beliefs and normative goals, ordered by salience. With
salience we refer to the degree of activation of a norm: in any particular situation,
one norm may be more frequent than others, its salience being higher. The
difference in salience between normative beliefs and normative goals has the
effect that some of these normative mental objects will be more active than
others and they will interfere more frequently and with more strength with the
general cognitive processes of the agent.
In the higher layer, actions (α) presented as deontics (D) or normative val-
uations (V) are stored; in the lower layer, instead, actions are stored only if
they have already been stored at the higher level, i.e., if they have been re-
ceived by the agent as deontics or normative valuations. We identify six possible
modals: assertions (A), i.e. generic sentences pointing to or describing states of
the world; behaviors (B), i.e. actions or reactions of an agent, with regard to
another agent or to the environment; requests (R), i.e. requests of action made
by another agent; deontics (D), partitioning situations between good/acceptable
and bad/unacceptable (we further distinguish deontics into three types: obliga-
tions, forbearances, permissions); normative valuations (V), i.e. assertions about
what it is right or wrong, correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate (i.e.
it is correct to respect the queue).
Aiming to decide which action to produce, the agent will search through
the normative board: if more than one is found out, the most salient norm will
be chosen. Once received the input, the agent will compute the information in
order to generate/update her normative beliefs. Every time a message containing
a deontic (D) or a normative valuation (V) is received, the relative action will be
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stored as a (possible) norm. This will sharpen agents’ attention: further messages
with the same content, especially when observed as open behaviors, will be
processed and stored at the same level. Beyond a certain normative threshold
(which represents the frequency of corresponding normative behaviors observed,
e.g. n% of the population), they will generate a new normative belief.
it exists in the 
(D) or NORMATIVE VALUATION (V) 
No
Fig. 1. The norm recognition module (in action): on the right side of the figure, from
the bottom the Input and the two layers of the module (layer 0 and layer 1) plus
the normative belief (generated or recognized); on the left side, the normative board.
Vertical arrows in the block on the right side indicate the process regulating the gener-
ation of a new normative belief. The input action (α) can match with a norm present
in the normative board (see the arrows path on the left side of the figure); or a new
normative belief can be formed if the agent receives an input action (α) (at least one
time as deontic or normative valuation) for a given number of times (as fixed by the
normative threshold; see the arrows path on the right side of the figure). If the agent
receives no other occurence of the same input action (α), after a fixed time t action α
exits from the higher level and the process is finalized (see Exit).
6 The Model
In our simulation model, the environment consists of four scenarios, in which the
agents can produce three different kinds of actions. We define two context-specific
actions for every scenario, and one action common to all scenarios. Therefore,
we have nine actions. Suppose that the first context is a postal office, the second
an information desk, the third our private apartment, and so on. In the first
context the action stand in the queue is a context-specific action, whereas in
the second a specific action could be occupy a correct place in front of the desk.
A common action for all of the contexts could be, answer when asked. Each of
our agents is provided with a personal agenda (i.e. a sequence of contexts), an
individual and constant time of permanence in each scenario (when the time of
permanence is expired, the agent moves to the next context) and a window of
observation (i.e. a capacity for observing and interacting with a fixed number
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of agents) of the actions produced by other agents. Norm Recognizers are also
provided with the three-layer architecture described above, necessary to analyze
the received information, and a normative board in which the normative beliefs,
once arisen, are stored. The agents can move across scenarios: once expired
the time of permanence in one scenario, each agent moves to the subsequent
scenario following her agenda. Such irregular flow (each agent has a different
time of permanence and a different agenda) generates a complex behavior of the
system, tick-after-tick producing a fuzzy definition of the scenarios, and tick-for-
tick a fuzzy behavioral dynamics.
We have modeled two different kinds of environmental conditions. In the first
set of simulations, agents can move through contexts (following their personal
agenda and in accordance with the personal time of permanence). In the second
set of simulations, from a fixed time t, agents are obliged to remain in the
context they have reached, till the end of the simulation: in this case agents
can explore the contexts exchanging messages with one another and observing
others’ behaviors. When they reach the last context at time t, they can interact
with same-context agents till the end of the simulation.
At each tick, the Norm Recognizers (NRs), paired randomly, interact ex-
changing messages. These inputs are represented on an ordered vector, consist-
ing of four elements: the source (x); the modal through which the message is
presented (M); the addressee (y); the action transmitted (a).
Codifying the input in such a way allows us to (a) access the information
even later, if necessary; (b) recognize the source, a piece of information that
might be useful to store inputs from recognized authorities; (c) account for a
variety of information, thanks to the modals’ syntax; (d) compute the received
information in order to generate a new normative belief. NRs produce different
behaviors: if the normative board of an agent is empty (i.e. it contains no norms),
the agent produces an action randomly chosen from the set of possible actions
(for the context in question); in this case, also the modal by means of which
the action is presented is chosen randomly. Vice versa, if the normative board
contains some norms, the agent chooses the action corresponding to the most
salient among these norms. In this case the action produced is presented with
one of these modals: deontic (D), normative valuation (Vn) or behavior (B).
This corresponds to the intuition that if an agent has a normative belief, there is
a high propensity (in this paper, this has been fixed to 90% ) for her to transmit
it to other agents under strong modals (D or Vn) or open behavior (B). We run
several simulations for different values of the threshold, testing the behaviors of
the agents in the two different experimental conditions.
7 Results and Discussion
We briefly summarize the simulation scheme. The process begins by producing
actions (and modals) at random. The process is synchronic. The process is more
and more complex runtime: agent i provides inputs to the agent who precedes
her (k=1 ), issuing one action and one modal. Action choice is conditioned by
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the state of her normative board. When all of the agents have executed one
simulation update, the whole process restarts at the next step.
7.1 Simulations’ Results
Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) show the trend of simulation in terms of number of
agents in each context runtime in both cases (the first with the external barrier,
the second without it).
(a) with barrier (b) without barrier
Fig. 2. Number of agents in each context runtime - with (left) and without (right)
external barrier
First of all we present the results obtained when imposing the external bar-
rier. Then, we present the results obtained when no barrier was imposed; finally
we compare the former with the latter results.
Figure 3(a) shows the overall number of different new normative beliefs gen-
erated at the end of the simulation: as we can see, in the barrier condition, agents
form more than one normative belief, whereas in the no barrier condition they
form one normative belief only.
Figure 4 shows the trend of new normative beliefs generation runtime for a
certain value of the norm threshold, which is a good implementation of our the-
ory: each line represents the generation of new normative beliefs corresponding
to an action (i.e. each line corresponds to the sum of different normative beliefs
present in all of the agents). To be noted, a normative belief is not necessarily
universally shared in the population. However, norms are behaviors that spread
thanks to the spreading of the corresponding normative belief. Therefore, they
imply shared normative beliefs.
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) are very similar (even if in the no-barrier variant, we
find some noise in the chromatic definition of different contexts). In these figures,
we cannot appreciate significant chromatic differences pointing to the normative
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(b) without barrier
Fig. 3. Overall number of new normative beliefs generated for each type of possible
action - with (left) and without (right) external barrier
Fig. 4. New normative beliefs generated runtime - with external constraint
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Fig. 5. Chromatic representation of the actions generated by the NRs. A different
action corresponds to each color: the dark blue color represents the action common
to the 4 scenarios; on axis X we find the number of agents (100) and on axis Y the
number of simulation ticks (200) - with (left) and without (right) external barrier
beliefs acting on the effective behaviors: we cannot distinguish the chromatic
effect corresponding to the agents’ convergence on a specific norm. This is due
to the length of these simulations, which is not sufficient to include the latency
time of norms. In the previous study, indeed, we showed that for a normative
belief to affect behavior, a certain number of ticks has to elapse, which we might
call norm latency. Indeed, if we run longer simulations, we can appreciate the
consequences of the results of our investigation: in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) we
can observe two chromatic effect: (a) more or less at the same time both in
the barrier (left) and no barrier (right) condition, a convergence on the common
action (dark blue) is forming, much more homogeneous in (5.b) than in (5.a); (b)
however, in the barrier condition, other areas of convergence are also emerging
(e.g. a light blue in the last column).
This corresponds to what is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 6 on one hand,
and Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) on the other: with external barrier, we can see
that the higher overall number of new normative beliefs generated does not cor-
respond to the common action (action 1) and the trend of new normative beliefs
generated runtime shows the same results. With no external barrier, instead,
only normative beliefs concerning action 1 are generated.
8 Concluding Remarks
We show that the model allows new norm, to emerge, despite another norm had
previously emerged. More interestingly, the new norms do not correspond to
the common action. Some rival norms now compete in the same social settings.
Obviously, they will continue to compete, unless some further external event or
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Fig. 6. New normative beliefs generated runtime - without external barrier
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Fig. 7. Chromatic representation of the actions generated by the NRs. A different
action corresponds to each color: the dark blue color represents the action common
to the 4 scenarios; on axis X we find the number of agents (100) and on axis Y the
number of simulation ticks (100) - with (left) and without (right) external barrier
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change in the population (e.g. the barrier removal) will cause agents to start
migrating again. It would be interesting to observe how long the rival norms will
survive after barrier removal, whether and when one will out-compete the others,
and if so, which one. It should be observed that, as we observe a latency time
for a normative belief to give rise to a new normative behavior, we also expect
some time to elapse before a given behavior disappears while and because the
corresponding belief, decreasingly fed by observation and communication, starts
to extinguish as well. We might call such a temporal discrepancy inertia of
the norm. Both latency and inertia are determined by the twofold nature of the
norm, mental and behavioral, which reinforce each other, thus preserving agents’
autonomy: external barriers do modify agents’ behaviors, but only through their
minds.
More than emergence, our simulation shows a norm innovation process; in
fact, Figure 4 shows that, starting around tick=60, two normative beliefs appear
in the normative boards and the overall number of these two new normative
beliefs generated is three times higher than the overall number of normative
beliefs concerning the common action 1 (Figure 3(a)). Analogously, in Figure
5(a) some areas of homogeneity start to appear beyond the dark blue one.
We might say that, if stuck to their current location by external barriers,
norm recognizers resist the effect of majority and do not converge on one equi-
librium only. Rather, they will form as many normative beliefs as there were
competing beliefs on the verge of overcoming the normative threshold before
the agents had been stuck to their locations. No such effect is expected among
agents whose behavior depends only from the observation of others.
In sum, is statistical frequency sufficient for a norm to emerge? Beside action
1, common to the four contexts, other norms seem to emerge in our simulation.
Hume seemed to doubt it [20].
Normative agents can recognize a norm; infer the existence of a norm by its
occurrences in open behavior under certain conditions (see the critical role of
previous deontics); and finally spread a normative belief to other agents.
Future studies are meant to investigate on the effect of barrier removal and
the inertia of normative beliefs.
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